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We implement the stable correspondence of a job matching market in Subgame
Perfect Equilibrium. We use a simple sequential mechanism in which firms propose
a salary to each worker (first stage) and, then, each worker accepts at most one
proposal (second stage). Moreover, if agents' preferences are additive, this
mechanism implements in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium the firms' optimal corre-
spondence when firms use undominated strategies. Finally, we construct another
simple sequential mechanism where the order of decisions is permuted and
which implements the workers' optimal correspondence when agents' preferences
are additive. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, D78.
INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we provide two mechanisms to implement the stable
correspondence (or a proper selection from it) in a job matching market
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with monetary transfers. The mechanisms proposed are very simple. They
are two-stage mechanisms. In the first stage, the agents on one side of the
market make simultaneous proposals to the members of the other side.
In the second stage, once all the proposals have been made, they are
either accepted or rejected. The final matching is determined by the
second-stage decisions, while the salaries come out from the first-stage
proposals.
In ``firms go fishing,'' the first hiring mechanism that we provide, firms
play first. Each firm proposes the wage for which it is ready to hire each
worker. In the second stage, each worker selects one among the first stage
proposals. In a general framework, this mechanism implements the core
correspondence in pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPE).
Moreover, if agents' preferences are additive, this mechanism implements in
SPE the firms' optimal stable correspondence when firms use undominated
pure strategies.
In the second mechanism, ``workers go fishing,'' each worker proposes a
firm and the wage for what she is ready to be hired by this firm. Then, each
firm selects the set of workers from among those that have chosen that firm
at stage one. Assuming that the preferences of the agents are additive, this
mechanism implements the workers' optimal stable allocations in SPE.
As it is apparent from the description of the mechanisms, they mimic
simple hiring procedures. In this sense, the paper can also be viewed as an
analysis of the behavior of simple hiring mechanisms. We show that simple
procedures do a very good job. In particular, the outcome of the hiring
procedures is stable, therefore the final matching is Pareto efficient.
There is a long tradition of game theoretic analysis in many-to-one
matching markets (see Roth and Sotomayor [8] for an excellent survey of
the results in matching models up to 1990). In job matching markets,
Kelso and Crawford [5] show that stable allocations may fail to exist. This
means that, in these markets, the core may be empty. They also provide a
property, called the gross-substitute condition, under which the set of
stable allocations is non-empty.
To our knowledge, ours is the first paper which deals with the implemen-
tation of stable allocations in job markets. Similar questions are being
investigated in related economic environments. For the college admissions
problems, that is, for many-to-one matching models without monetary
transfers, Kara and So nmez [4] provide a general analysis of the problem
of implementation. In particular, they show that the stable correspondence
is implementable in Nash equilibrium, while no particular selection from
the core is Nash implementable. Also in the college admissions problem,
Alcalde and Romero-Medina [2] implement the core correspondence in
SPE. They use a sequential mechanism where the colleges (or the students)
propose a matching, and then the students (or the colleges) must simply
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accept or reject the proposed allocation. Peleg [6]1 considers a very similar
sequential mechanism for the marriage (one-to-one matching) problem.2
By contrast, in our ``firms go fishing'' mechanism firms propose prices at
which transactions can be made, and then the actual matching is decided
by each worker facing all the transaction prices.
Finally, in a context where the bilateral structure plays no role, Pe rez-
Castrillo [7] and Serrano [10] present sequential mechanisms which
implement the core of any cooperative game in characteristic form.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic model.
Section 3 presents a mechanism to implement the core for job markets when
monetary transfers are allowed. Section 4 studies implementation of both the
firms' and workers' optimal stable correspondences in additive environments.
2. THE MODEL
We consider a job market with n workers and l firms. Let W=
[w1 , ..., wn] and F=[ f
1, ..., f l] be the set of workers and firms, respec-
tively. The preferences of each worker depend on two variables. The first
one is the firm she is working for, whereas the second relevant aspect is the
wage that this firm pays to her. Worker wi pr f r nc ar r pr ntabl
by the utility function Ui ( f
j, pi), which is non-decreasing and continuous
in pi #R, where pi is the salary that worker wi receives and f
j is the firm
she is working for. A worker who is not hired by any firm reaches a utility
level Ui (<, 0). That is, we represent by f=< the situation in which the
worker is not hired by any firm. We also assume that for each firm f j
there is a reservation salary r ji such that Ui ( f
j, r ji )=Ui (<, 0) and that
Ui ( f
j, p i) has the same limit as p i tends to + independently of the
identity of the firm f j.3
The profit of each firm depends on the set of workers it hires, say
W jW, and the salaries it pays to them, say P j=( p ji )wi #W j . For nota-
tional convenience, we will sometimes treat P j as a vector in Rn,
P j=(p ji )wi #W , and assume that the profit of the firm j does not depend on
p ji for wi W
j. Let ? j: 2W_RnR be the profit function of firm f j .
? j (W j, P j) is decreasing in salaries p ji whenever wi #W
j. A firm which does
not hire any worker obtains ? j (<, 0).
We describe a job market allocation by means of two variables. The first
one is a vector P #Rn representing the wage that each worker gets, where
1 We thank an anonymous associated editor for bringing this paper to our attention.
2 Peleg [6] also provides a simultaneous mechanism to implement the core in strong equi-
librium.
3 This condition can be relaxed by assuming that the maximum limit of Ui ( f
j, pi) as pi
tends to + is reached by at least two firms.
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pi=0 if wi is not hired by any firm. The second one is a correspondence,
to be called a matching, that states which firm (if any) hires each worker
and vice-versa. More precisely, a matching + is a correspondence that maps
W_F into itself such that (a) for each wi #W, if +(wi) does not belong to
F, then it is the empty set; (b) for each f j in F, +( f j) is contained in W,
and (c) for each pair (wi , f
j) #W_F, +(wi)= f
j if and only if wi belongs
to +( f j).
We are interested in the job market allocations that are stable. The
stability of an allocation depends on the possibilities which agents have to
improve their utility level (if workers) or their profits (if firms). An alloca-
tion is stable if the following two conditions are satisfied. The first one is
individual rationality: Each agent weakly prefers the payoff that sheit gets
in this allocation rather than being unmatched. The second one is collective
rationality, in the following sense: It is not possible for a firm and a group
of workers to allocate their resources, in such a way that both the firm and
the workers it hires find the new situation profitable. That is, (+, P ) is
stable if, and only if, _3 (W , f j) # 2W_(F_<) and P #Rn such that
(i) Ui ( f
j, p^i)>Ui (+(wi), pi) for all wi #W , where p^i=0 if f
j=<,
and
(ii) ? j (W , P ) ? j (+( f j), P ), wher P 0 if W <
Notice that, in this model, the notion of stability is equivalent to the
usual definition of the core. An allocation is stable if it is robust to devia-
tions by a coalition of one firm and a group of workers, or by a firm or
a worker alone. These coalitions are the only essential coalitions in this
environment. A coalition formed by several firms and workers can be
broken down into subunits, each containing at most one firm. Similarly,
coalitions formed only by firms or workers can be broken down into sub-
units each one containing only one agent.
In job markets, the set of stable allocations may be empty. This can hap-
pen when workers are complementary in the sense that a set of workers
generates more income than the sum of the income from each worker
separately (see Roth and Sotomayor [8] for an example). Kelso and
Crawford [5] propose a condition, the ``gross substitutes condition'', that
rules out this possibility, guarantying the existence of stable allocations in
the market. The assumption requires that increases of other workers' salary
should never lead a firm to withdraw an offer from a worker whose salary
has not risen.4
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4 More precisely, denote M j (P ) the set of solutions to the problem maxW /W?
j (W , P ).
Consider two vectors of salaries P and P , and a set of workers W W. Let denote
T j (W ; P, P )#[w i |w i #W and pi=p i]. The gross substitutes condition requires that for every
f j, if W #M j (P) and P P, then there exists W #M j (P ) such that T j (W ; P, P )W .
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THE ``FIRMS GO FISHING'' MECHANISM
This section presents a mechanism implementing the stable corres-
pondence in SPE (recall that we only consider pure strategy equilibria).
This mechanism reflects a natural form of firms' competition for workers.
Firms' behavior will be modeled by a kind of Bertrand competition.
Consider the following two-stage mechanism, called 1 F. In the first stage
each firm proposes a vector of salaries (one for each worker). Once the
salaries have been announced, each worker selects a firm. The outcome of
this game is the following. The matching is induced by the choices of the
workers at the second stage, whereas the salary to be payed is the one that
firms proposed at the first stage.
More precisely, at the first stage, firms send their messages simulta-
neously. Each firm's message space is Rn. A message for firm f j,
m j=(m j1 , ..., m
j
n), will be understood as the salary at which it is willing to
hire each worker. At the second stage, and knowing firms' messages,
worker wi m ag , mi , i an lem nt of F_ [<] That i , a work r
trat gy i a function from Rn to F_ [<] A m ag mi will b under
stood as the firm worker wi is willing to work for at the salary proposed
by this firm at the first stage. The outcome function ,1( } ) associates to each
set of messages, m~ =(m1, ..., m j, ..., ml, m1 , ..., m i , ..., mn) a matching, +
m~ ,
and a vector of salaries, P(m~ ) #Rn such that
(a) for any wi #W, +
m~ (wi)=m i , and
(b) pi (m~ )=m
+m~ (wi )
i if +
m~ (wi) # F and pi (m~ )=0 otherwise.
The next theorem analyzes the SPE of the mechanism 1 F.
Theorem 3.1. Suppose there are at least two firms. The mechanism 1 F
implements in SPE the stable correspondence.
Proof. We first prove that each SPE outcome is stable. Let m~ be the
vector of messages that agents state at a certain SPE. Suppose that
,1(m~ )=(+m~ , P(m~ )) is not stable. Then we have three possibilities. First, a
worker wi can get less utility than Ui (<, 0). In this case, the worker would
be better off with the message mi=< than with m~ i . Second, a firm f
j
profits can be lower than ? j (<, 0). Then, the firm would benefit changing
its message m~ j by m ji=& for all wi #W.
5 The third possibility is that
there is a profitable deviation concerning one firm and a proper subset of
workers. Thus, assume that there are a firm f k, a set of workers W k, and
a vector of salaries P , such that
5 If the reservation salaries r ji are all positive, we do not need negative salaries. For example
mki =0 works as well as m
k
i =&.
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(i) Ui ( f
k, p i)>Ui (+
m~ (wi), pi (m~ )) for all w i in W
k, and
(ii) ?k (Wk, P )>?k (+m~ ( f k), P(m~ )).
Let us consider the following strategy for f k: mki =p i if wi #W
k and
mki =& otherwise, keeping constant the strategies m~
j, for f j{ f k. At the
second stage each agent in W chooses her employer in order to maximize
her utility level. Because of condition (i ) above, the message of any worker
wi in W
k will be m i= f
k. Notice that Ui ( f
k, p i)>Ui (+
m~ (wi), pi (m~ )) and
Ui (+
m~ (wi), pi (m~ ))Ui ( f
j, m ji ) for any f
j since +m~ (wi) was the optimal
choic giv n m~ Mor ov r, no work r wh out id W
k will nd a m s ag
uch a mh f
k Ther for , it i in f k int r t to d viat which i a
contradiction.
We now prove that each stable allocation can be supported by a SPE.
Let (+, P ) be a stable allocation. Take wi such that +(wi) # F, and denote
by p^ ji the salary that firm f
j would have to pay to worker wi for her to be
indifferent between working in firm f j at a salary p^ ji and working in firm
+(wi) at a salary pi . Note that p^
j
i exists because Ui ( f
k, pi) has the same
limit as pi tends to + independently of f
k.
Consider the following strategies: Each firm f j sends the message m j,
where
m ji={
p^ jj
r ji
if +(w i) # F
otherwise.
When confronted to the previous firms' strategies, worker i 's message is
mi=+(wi). For any other possible firms' strategies, she makes any choice
that maximizes her utility. These strategies constitute a SPE yielding the
desired allocation. K
We can read Theorem 3.1 in two ways. First, the theorem shows that it
i po ibl to implem nt th tabl corr pond nc in quit a g n ral mod l
by u ing v ry simpl m chani m Although w alr ady knew that the
stable correspondence (the core) was implementable, it is interesting to
know that the implementation can be achieved through ``natural''
mechanisms. Second, the result tells us that simple hiring procedures do a
good job. They lead to stable, and hence efficient, allocations. In this sense,
our theorem can be understood as the characterization of the outcome of
a particular hiring mechanism.
Theorem 3.1 establishes the equivalence between the core of the job
matching market and the SPE of 1 F. However, we have already remarked
that the core may be empty. When this happens, we know that 1 F has no
SPE in pure strategies. Unfortunately, analyzing mixed strategies of 1 F is
very difficult, so we cannot characterize the outcome of the mechanism in
those games where the stable correspondence is empty.
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4. ``FISHING'' IN ADDITIVE ENVIRONMENTS
Sometimes, we would like to have the possibility of selecting some par-
ticular allocations from the correspondence of stable allocations. Hence,
this section is devoted to study the implementation of particular selections
of the stable correspondence. More precisely, we show first that, if firms
employ undominated strategies, the mechanism 1 F implements in SPE the
firms' optimal stable correspondence. Second, we design a mechanism
implementing the workers' optimal stable correspondence in SPE.
However, in order to do it, we are forced to restrict attention to additive
environments: outside these environments, the results do not hold. Let us
first recall what an additive environment is, and the characteristics of the
two abovementioned stable selections: the firms' and the workers' optimal
stable correspondences.
4.1. Additive Job Matching Markets
We assume that worker wi pr fer nc ar r pr s ntabl by the utility
function Ui ( f
j, p i) pi r
j
i , wher r
j
i i the r rvation alary of work r wi
when she is working for firm f j. We also assume that there is a function
g j: 2WR which represents the income that firm f j earns whenever it
engages a certain set of workers. Thus, if firm f j hires workers in W j at
salaries P j=( p ji )wi #W j , its profit is ?
j (W j, P j)= g j (W j)&wi #W j p
j
i .
Moreover, we also assume that it is possible to identify the value of a
worker to a firm, this value being independent of the worker's colleagues.
That is, there are numbers g ji , for i=1, ..., n and j=1, ..., m such that
g j (W j)=wi #W j g
j
i . Therefore, ?
j (W j, P j)=wi #W j (g
j
i& p
j
i ). With this
assumption, we rule out the possibility of complementarity among workers.
Given our's hypotheses on workers' utility functions and on firms'
profits, the market satisfies the gross-substitutes condition of Kelso and
Crawford [5]. Therefore, stable allocations always exist. Moreover, they
are easy to characterize. An allocation (P, +) is stable if and only if
+(wi)= f
jO pi&r
j
imax[[g
k
i &r
k
i ]k{ j , 0] and pig
j
i ,
+(wi)=<Omax
k
[gki &r
k
i ]0.
Notice that the set of stable matchings coincides with the set of efficient
and individually rational matchings. Among the set of stable allocations, it
is possible to identify the subset of allocations most preferred by firms. This
is the firms' optimal stable correspondence. For a stable allocation to be
firms' optimal, the necessary and sufficient condition is that
+(wi)= f
j # FOpi=max[[g
k
i &r
k
i +r
j
i ]k{ j , r
j
i ].
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Finally, the necessary and sufficient condition for a stable allocation to
be workers' optimal is
+(wi)= f
j # FOpi= g
j
i .
4.2. Firms' Fishing
In order to introduce the next result, let us consider the following very
simple market. There are two firms f 1 and f 2 and one worker, with g11=5,
g21=2, and r
1
1=r
2
1=0. The stable allocations match the worker with f
1 at
a salary p # [2, 5]. Consider the stable allocation with p=4. The only
strategy-profile that supports this allocation in the mechanism 1 F is the
following: m1=m2=4 and
m1={
f 1
f 2
<
if m1m2 and m10
if m2>m1 and m20
otherwise.
However, note that the strategy m2=4 is weakly dominated for firm two
by the strategy m2=2. That is, the SPE implementation of the stable
correspondence requires the use of dominated strategies.
We say that a SPE is an undominated SPE (USPE) if no agent plays
a strategy which is dominated for herit. Theorem 4.1 analyzes the out-
come of the mechanism 1 F in additive environments when firms use
undominated strategies.
Theorem 4.1. In additive environments the mechanism 1 F implements in
USPE the firms ' optimal stable correspondence.
Proof. By Theorem 3.1 we know that every SPE outcome is stable. Let
m~ be the vector of messages that agents state in a certain SPE for this
game. Assume that ,1(m~ ) (+m~ , P(m~ )) do not b long to the firm
optimal table corr pondenc W ar going to how that at lea t on firm
is using a dominated strategy.
Since (+m~ , P(m~ )) is stable but is not optimal from the point of view of
firms, there should be wi and f
j such that
+m~ (wi)= f
j # F with pi (m~ )>max[[g
k
i &r
k
i +r
j
i ]k{ j , r
j
i ].
Assume that max[[gki &r
k
i +r
j
i ]k{ j , r
j
i ]= g
h
i&r
h
i+r
j
i for some h{ j
(the other case is similar). Given that the allocation is the outcome of a
SPE, it cannot be the case that pi (m~ )=m
j
i>m
k
i &r
k
i +r
j
i for every k{ j.
Otherwise, firm j would have a profitable deviation decreasing m ji while
keeping it above mki &r
k
i +r
j
i for every k{ j. Thus, _ k{ j such that
pi (m~ )=m
k
i &r
k
i +r
j
i and pi (m~ )>g
k
i &r
k
i +r
j
i . Then, m
k
i >g
k
i . But it is a

8
dominated strategy for a firm to make offers greater than its valuation,
since in the best possible case it does not hire the worker (so it gets zero
from this offer), while it could be the case that its offer is the most attrac-
tive for the worker an then it loses money with her. The strategy mki is
dominated by m ki = g
k
i .
For the reverse implication, let (+, P ) be a firms' optimal stable alloca-
tion. Consider the following strategies. The message (and strategy) of firm
f j is m j=P j, where
p^ ji={
p i
g ji
if wi # +( f
j)
otherwise.
When confronted with the previous firms' strategies, worker i 's message
is mi +(wi) For any other pos ibl firm trat gi , h mak any choic
that maximiz her utility The trategi for firm and work r con titut
a SPE leading to (+, P ). Moreover, no agent uses dominated strategies. K
Note that the mechanism 1 F generates a sort of Bertrand competition
among firms. Nevertheless, as Theorem 4.1 states, the outcomes that are
expected from the agents' strategical behavior are the optimal stable alloca-
tions from the firms' point of view. Hence, the competition between the
firms is strong enough to make them reach stable outcomes, but the fact
that they are playing first allows them to reach the most profitable among
the stable allocations.
The result that Bertrand competition among firms does not lead to
workers' optimal allocations is not surprising in our framework. This can
be seen as follows. The firms know that, at the second stage, each worker
has a dominant strategy, which consist of selecting the firm with whom she
maximizes her utility. Given this, firms can obtain the maximum benefit
from strategical behavior. Similar results in matching models are due to
Alcalde [1] for one-to-one matching markets and to Schummer [9] and
Demange and Gale [3] for the assignment problem. In Serrano [10],
where the core of convex games is implemented, the player who acts first,
announcing the vector of prices, (the broker, in Serrano's terminology) also
gets her best core payoff.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to generalize Theorem 4.1 to more
general environments. In markets where the value of a worker to a firm
depends on other workers hired by the firm, the mechanism 1 F can imple-
ment in undominated strategies a set of outcomes larger than the firms'
optimal stable allocations.
As a simple example, consider two firms, f 1 and f 2, and two workers,
w1 and w2 . Workers maximize salary and their reservation salary is
zero. Firms profits are given by ? j (W j, P j)= g j (W j)&wi #W j p
j
i , where:
g j ([wi])=3 and g
j ([w1 , w2])=4, for j, i=1, 2.
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The undominated strategies represented by the messages m1=m2=
(2, 2), m1= f
1, m2= f
2, with any optimal workers' response for out-of-
equilibrium firms' strategies, lead to a stable allocation which is not firms'
optimal allocation.
4.3. Workers' Fishing
This subsection presents a two-stage mechanism implementing the
workers' optimal stable allocation in SPE. Let us refer to it by 1W. In the
fir t tag , work r play imultan ou ly Each of th m announc a alary
and a firm for which h i willing to work Th work r will only b hir d
if she is offered at least this salary by the firm. Once the salary demands
to the firms have been announced, firms simultaneously (or sequentially)
select their set of workers. The outcome is determined as follows. The
matching is the one induced by the choice of the firms at the second stage,
whereas the salary to be payed is determined by the demands of the
workers.
More precisely, each worker's message space is R_[F_<]. A message
for worker wi , mi=( pi , fi), will be understood as the salary pi at which she
is willing to work for a certain firm fi . Knowing the workers' messages,
firm f j 's message, m j, is a selection from [wi #W | fi= f
j]. That is, a firm
f j 's strategy is a function from [R_[F_<]]n to 2W such that
m j (m1 , ..., mn)/[wi #W | f i= f
j]. A message m j will be understood as the
set of workers that firm f j is willing to hire given the salaries they asked
for at the first stage. The outcome function ,2( } ) associates with each
message, m~ =(m1 , ..., mi , ..., mn , m
1, ..., m j, ..., ml) a matching, +m~ , and a
vector of salaries, P(m~ ) #Rn such that
(a) for each f j # F, +m~ ( f j)=m j, and
(b) pi (m~ )= pi if +
m~ (w i) # F, or pi (m~ )=0 otherwise.
We next introduce our main result in this section.
Theorem 4.2. In additive environments the mechanism 1W implements in
SPE the workers ' optimal stable correspondence.
Proof. First, a firm f j is willing to satisfy any demand of a worker
whose value is above her demand. Therefore, in any SPE, it is the case that
wi #m
j whenever f i= f
j and pi<g
j
i , while w i m
j whenever pi>g
j
i .
Second, for a given firm, the worker is interested in maximizing the salary.
Let worker wi send the message mi=( pi , fi) in equilibrium, where pi=0 if
fi=<. It is necessarily the case that pi= g
fi
i if fi # F. A message with pi>g
fj
i
would lead to wi remaining unmatched, while if pi<g
fj
i and g
fj
i >r
fj
i , then
worker wi could increase her demand of salary, still being sure that her
offer would be accepted. Finally, worker wi can choose among the set of

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firms or remaining unmatched, knowing the maximum demand that each
firm is ready to accept. She will choose the situation that maximizes her
utility, that is, in equilibrium it is the case that
fi # FO fi # arg max
k
[gki &r
k
i ], and
fi=<Omax
k
[gki &r
k
i ]0
Moreover, in equilibrium, pi= g
fi
i . Therefore, the equilibrium leads
necessarily to a workers' optimal allocation.
On the other hand, let (+^, P ) be a workers' optimal stable allocation. Let
us consider the following strategies. For each worker wi her message
(strategy) is mi=( pi , fi), where
(pi , fi)={
( p^ i , +^(w i))
(0,<)
if +^(wi) # F and
if +^(wi)  F.
Each firm f j 's message is
m j=[wi #W | pig
j
i ].
These strategies yield a SPE whose outcome is the allocation (+^, P ). K
Note that, when markets are not additive, unstable allocations can be
supported by SPE of the mechanism 1W, as shown in the next example.
See Fig. 1.
FIGURE 1.
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Let F=[ f 1, f 2], W=[w1 , w2], r
j
i= g
j ([wi])=0 for all i and j,
g1(W )=2, and g2(W )=5. In such a case, the strategies m1=m2=( f
1, 1),
m1=[w1 , w2] and m
2=<, with any optimal firms' response for out-of-
equilibrium workers' strategies, constitute a SPE for 1W. Note that the
outcome of such an equilibrium is not stable because it can be blocked by
f 2 and W by stating salaries p1= p2=2.
Let us finally remark that we can also state Theorem 4.2 in undominated
strategies, since we have not used dominated strategies in the proof. That
is, the mechanism 1W impl m nt in SPE the work r optimal table
allocation when work r trategi ar undominat d
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